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Abstract 
 
or economic transactions, including debt transactions, to occur in a 
market system, property rights are essential. The literature has 
focussed on finding empirical proof of the effect of property right 
regimes, noting differences between de jure and de facto property 
rights. We use a novel combination of data on wealth and 
demographics to investigate the effects of property right regimes on 
economic outcomes at the individual level. At the Cape, de jure 
property rights between freehold and loan farms differed. Historians, 
however, suggest that de facto property rights between these two 
property types were the same. We exploit the random variation of the 
birth order, specifically being the eldest son, to estimate whether the 
type of farm and therefore the type of property rights, mattered for 
economic activity, in our case, debt transactions. Our results suggest 
that historians were correct: loan farms were as secure in their de facto 
property rights, despite differences in de jure property rights. Our 
results confirm that the local context in which property right regimes are 
embedded is at least as important as the property right regime itself. 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
In order for any transaction, including debt transactions, to occur, an economic 
system, according to Douglas North (1989), needs ‘well-specified and well-enforced 
property rights’.  Ronald Coase (1960), too, concluded that without the delimitation 
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of initial rights no market transactions can take place. Such property right systems 
evolve, suggested Harold Demsetz (1967), from the ‘laws, customs and mores of a 
society’. These authors formed the beginning of a study into property rights as an 
economic institution and their importance for economic development. 
 
More recent studies have attempted to find empirical proof to explain the emergence 
and persistence of property rights systems, and their long-run impact on economic 
development. Two studies of the developing world stand out. Acemoglu, Johnson, & 
Robinson (2001) use settler mortality as an instrument for the initial property rights 
systems installed by colonial powers and show that this initial system mattered for 
long-term development. Sokoloff & Engermann (2000) compare different New 
World economies and found that regions where land was acquired with relative ease, 
are more affluent today. A key to the Sokoloff & Engermann hypothesis is the 
relative land abundance and the unequal distribution of factor endowments. 
 
Because of the diversity of property right systems, Africa has attracted much 
attention. Fenske (2012) study land abundance in nineteenth-century Nigeria and 
finds that land abundance caused weak property rights in land, which meant that 
slaves were used as collateral in market transactions rather than land. Austin (2005: 
344), in an extensive study on the Asante in Ghana, links a change in property rights 
to the adoption of cocoa farming. He proposes that it was the value of the planted 
cocoa trees which gave the land its value and as this form of farming expanded, the 
land became valuable, scarcer and this ensured better-protected rights. Hopkins 
(1973: 38) summarizes this process as follows: ‘…it was the product of scarce factor, 
labour, which was closely defined, whereas rights over land, which was in general 
an abundant resource, were less specific.’ Goldstein & Udry (2008) show how 
individuals who are uncertain of their land rights in Ghana tend to invest less, and 
that this lowers their productivity. Goldstein (2015), in a study on gender in Benin, 
found that more secure property rights increased investment in the long run for cash 
crops and such rights could also lead to a decrease in the gender gap in land fallowing. 
In Uganda from 1965 to 1995, two different property systems, customary tenure 
system and ‘mailo’ tenure system, had different effects on agricultural outcomes 
(Place & Otsuka, 2000). 
 
Land abundance is however not the only influence on long-term persistence of land 
property rights. In India, different land tenure systems were observed under British 
rule with different long-term outcomes. Banerjee & Iyer (2005) show that the 
historical districts where large landlords (equated with relatively weak property 
rights) were in control, less investment and productivity is observed post-
independence. Dell (2010) showed that large landowners in Peru had well-defined 
and secure property rights. However, the large landowners, different from India, had 
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the ability to protect their workforce from forced labour and in the long run, more 
public service provision is observed in these regions. These case studies show how 
the social environment of laws and norms in which the property right system evolve 
could result in opposite development trajectories.  
 
This paper presents the eighteenth-century Cape Colony as another example. The 
Cape was land abundant; labour, often imported as slaves from the East Indies, were 
expensive relative to the land acquired (through conquest or disease) from the 
indigenous Khoisan. But two property right systems nevertheless existed: a freehold 
and loan farm system. Freehold farms were outright ownership of property and land. 
Loan farms were leaseholds were individuals did not have legal right to own the 
farms they cultivated. The property remained under the ownership of the Dutch East 
India Company (hereafter, the Company). Our aim is to show that the beliefs about 
property rights rather than the legally defined rights are what mattered for economic 
outcomes at the Cape. In this paper, we assume de jure rights are how the ownership 
is defined by law, while de facto rights are how these laws are observed and 
implemented by society. 
 
The evolution of laws governing land ownership in the United States has been the 
focus of economic historians too. De Soto (2001) show how property rights laws 
changed over time in the US and concluded that the property law was successful once 
it took the social norms of settlers on the frontier into account. Focused on the effect 
of one particular law, the Homestead Act of 1834, Lamoreaux (2011) showed the 
allocation of land by the government will be fruitful as long as individuals still 
believe their underlying rights to the property are secure.  
 
The legal right to use land (or have ownership of it) is, however, not the only aspect 
which mattered for property rights and economic development. Hornbeck (2010) 
demonstrated that it is equally important to have the ability to protect land, rather 
than only the legal right to own it. This ability to protect one’s land is especially 
important for frontier settlements due to the continual expansion and movement of 
boundaries, with new land available for use and ownership. 
 
The interaction between legal ownership of land and the ability to protect the land is 
also the focus of Alston, Harris & Mueller (2012) and Dye & La Croix (2013, 2014). 
Alston et al. develop a model to investigate how de jure, de facto and enforcement 
of property rights interact during the early settlement periods. Applying their model 
to Australia, the United States, and Brazil, they show how frontiers settled between 
de facto to de jure property rights with the interaction between individuals (or 
groups) and the government. Dye & La Croix (2013) also show how differences 
emerge in the adoption of property right institutions and how Spanish colonies lagged 
behind British colonies in this regard. They show how, despite earlier de jure 
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property rights in Buenos Aires, the de facto property rights in New South Wales 
ultimately was more successful. 
 
Dye & La Croix (2014) expand the model by applying it to the colonial South African 
case. They conclude that, instead of following the path from de jure to de facto rights, 
a new system developed – the loan farm system. The loan farm system was a response 
to the declining threat of the Khoisan, the indigenous population present at the Cape 
when settlers arrived in the seventeenth century. They argue that the loan farm system 
evolved from a de facto to a de jure system because settlers made de facto claims 
outside the official boundary where they did not have the formal protection of de jure 
claims. The decline in the Khoisan population after a smallpox epidemic in 1713 
spurred the Company to officially establish the new form of loan farms on the frontier 
and extract revenue from it, giving the de facto claims de jure rights as well.   
 
This paper builds on Dye & La Croix’s model (2014) by applying empirical tools 
and an innovative combination of datasets to test whether the property right regime 
matter for individual outcomes, specifically the ability to trade on credit. Newton-
King (1999) and Fourie (2014) show that wealth levels at the Cape were high, but 
both ignore debt and credit transactions. Swanepoel & Fourie (2018) have used these 
transactions to show the extent and nature of credit transactions at the Cape. They 
study the development of the monetary system, what type of collateral was used for 
debt and what characteristics of individuals were important for debt transactions. 
They found that debt and the number of debt transactions were good proxies for the 
relative wealth of the individual. We exploit this dataset of credit transactions even 
further to identify differences in the economic outcomes of the two property rights 
regimes at the Cape. We use the different types of property recorded in the probate 
inventories and debt to test whether property rights had any impact on debt 
transactions. 
 
In a detailed study on the relationship between property rights and debt, Feder & 
Feeny (1991) suggest land is only valuable as collateral where uncertainty and 
asymmetric information is absent with regard to the rights on the land. In the Alston 
et al. (2012) model, this would make land valuable for debt transactions where the 
de facto and de jure specification and enforcement of property rights are the same. 
The descriptive evidence we report below suggests that freehold farms, with more 
secure de jure property rights, had more debt. If the theory that only well-defined de 
jure and de facto property rights make land valuable for trading, it would imply that 
freehold farms with more debt had more secure de facto property rights. 
 
The main concern with such descriptive evidence and the evidence presented by 
historians is endogeneity. Our contribution is to make use of an instrumental variable 
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to remove reverse causality and to test if the differences in the de jure and de facto 
property rights of freehold and loan farms had an impact on economic activity or, in 
our case, debt transactions. We use being the eldest son as an external and random 
event to possessing a freehold farm. In the patriarchal society of the Cape, eldest sons 
were favoured to inherit freehold farms despite the Roman-Dutch law for equal 
inheritance between children. Our results from this instrumental variable approach 
support the existing historical literature which suggests that, despite the large de jure 
difference between the two systems, the property right ensconced in the loan farms 
system were viewed similarly to those of the freehold system.  
 
These results contribute to the wider literature on property rights and its impact on 
economic outcomes. The lack of support for a strong correlation between de jure 
rights and debt supports scholars like De Soto (2001), who emphasises social norms 
and observed property rights rather than de jure claims. Our results thus provide more 
nuance to classic institutional and growth theory which propose that de jure property 
rights are always and everywhere a necessary if not sufficient component of 
economic growth. 
 
2 The land policies at the Cape 
 
When the Cape was first settled by Europeans in 1652, the plan was not for it to 
become a settlement colony. The Company wanted the Cape to serve as a refreshment 
station to passing ships between Europe and Asia. Because of the high demand for 
fresh produce and an inability to increase supply sufficiently, the Company released 
nine employees to become freehold farmers around the Liesbeeck River in Cape 
Town, only five years after arrival.  
 
The vision of Company commander, Jan van Riebeeck, was small-scale farming, 
modelled on the European example. The plan soon failed. The crops brought with 
the settlers from Europe were unsuited for the soil and weather patterns of the Cape. 
More territory was needed. Under Governor Simon van der Stel, European settlement 
expanded toward the fertile mountainous region of Stellenbosch and the surrounding 
regions. Here, farmers could claim any land cultivated within three years. These 
initial claims were mostly given to settlers in freehold – the only requirement for 
settlers to relinquish one-tenth of the annual grain produced as a tax to the Company 
in Cape Town (Duly, 1968: 14). Many of these freehold farmers became known as 
the ‘landed gentry’. The nature and size of these freehold farms made them more 
tradable and the prices of freehold farms increased throughout the period (Guelke, 
1989: 79).  
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Although the soil quality2 would certainly have differed between the farms, most had 
access to a river (Guelke & Shell, 1983). Due to the unavailability of suitable soil in 
the region, the freehold farm system was terminated to new claims in 1717, although 
settlers did continue to trade and inherit these freehold farms well after 1717 
(Newton-King, 1999: 18). 
 
The second, and after 1717, most used form of property at the Cape was loan farms. 
Loan farms were obtained with relative ease: they were simply loaned from the 
Company for three, six or twelve months at a fixed rate, the size determined by riding 
half-an-hour on horseback in each direction. Duly (1968: 15) notes: ‘the system was 
a form of legalized squatting’. The only parts of loan farms which could legally be 
sold were the fixed improvements; settlers thus had no de jure rights to the land they 
lived on under the loan farm system, but de facto settlers saw these loan farms as 
their property.  
 
But, like other colonial land systems, de facto rights often evolved into de jure rights. 
Guelke (1976: 31) argues that ‘…[i]n practice there was little distinction between 
freehold land and leeningsplaatsen (loan farms).’3 In fact, he goes further by saying 
‘…the leases became so secure that the fixed improvements (which could be sold) 
came to reflect the value of the whole property’.  Newton-King (1999: 99), in the 
most authoritative contribution to the history of the Cape frontier, submits the loan 
farms were similarly secure as the freehold farms. It is also evidence like this used 
by Dye & La Croix to conclude that the loan farm system was a unique system that 
developed from de facto rights to de jure rights. 
 
Before we continue to compare the freehold and loan farms systems in terms of 
property rights, a note here on the colonial expansion and land alienation. The 
Khoisan offered little resistance to Europeans seizing their land. Their nomadic 
lifestyle gave the Europeans easy access to land often claimed as uninhabited from 
the Khoisan. Skirmishes between the groups often resulted in the Khoisan conceding 
land in order to keep cattle and sheep obtained from the Europeans. Trade between 
                                                        
2Although farm size, soil quality and distance from Cape Town certainly matter, these are difficult to control 
for various reasons. Farm size is not recorded specifically in the probates or if there is mention of the size, it is 
the Company's prescribed 60 morgen. Land demarcation and the mapping of farms only happened in the mid-
nineteenth century. Soil quality is also difficult to control for since the exact geographic location of the farms 
are unknown, which is also the reasons it is not possible to control for the distance from Cape Town. The 
descriptions are often vague, for example, ‘next to a river', or ‘in the district of', where districts often covered 
large areas.  
3 It should be noted here that the loan farms system at the Cape was similar to the Dutch system of the sixteenth 
century. De Vries & Van Der Woude (1997:161–162) found the tenants in the Netherlands had strong legal 
support and it was often difficult for owners to replace tenants.  They state that ‘tenants acquired de facto 
permanent possession while the owners held nothing more than an old right to collect a fixed money rental.’ 
Mitchell (2008 Chapter 3, p.4) calls the ‘loan farm system a remnant of Dutch feudal land tenure practice.’ 
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the Europeans and the Khoisan inevitably impoverished the Khoisan, and many were 
later forced to work on the European farms to survive. The number of Khoisan in the 
colony also declined after outbreaks of smallpox in 1713 and 1755 and forced many 
tribes to move inland (De Villiers, 2012: 47). The colonial expansion was only halted 
when the European expansion toward the east was halted by the isiXhosa speaking 
tribes in the early nineteenth century, who were more numerous and had better 
weapons technology than the Khoisan (Fourie & von Fintel, 2010). 
 
A concern in comparing the de facto and de jure property rights in an economic 
context would be the strength of the de jure property rights, especially for the loan 
farms. The Company in de jure terms had the rights to reclaim loan farms if the 
annual rent was not paid, while they could not do the same with the freehold farms. 
Gie (1963: 153) postulates that this rarely happened and says farms would only be 
claimed by the Company if they wanted to establish a town in the area. In such a 
case, the farmer was also fully compensated for the land. The Company also did not 
act on the de jure rights of the loan farms, as there were large arrears for these farms 
at the start of the nineteenth century. Only after the second take-over by the British 
government in 1806 did land and taxation become a significant priority for the 
government (Duly, 1968: 61; Newton-King, 1999: 147). 
 
In comparing the two systems, Guelke (1976) concluded that the freehold farms were 
more valuable because of their relative proximity to Cape Town.4 The value of these 
freehold farms spurred settlers to protect their farms as best they could. The Company 
initially provided ample military protection to freehold farmers, but as the frontier 
expanded and the threat from the Khoisan ebbed, farms, especially loan farms, 
enjoyed less protection (Fourie et al., 2013). Although this protection was linked to 
the threat of Khoisan retaliation, it inevitably also included the protection against 
other settlers.  
 
The freehold and loan farms were clearly distinct in their de jure property rights. The 
freehold farms de jure enjoyed more secure property rights – they were tradable and 
inheritable – while the loan farms were not. However, some historians suggest that 
the de facto property rights of loan farms were similar to those of the freehold farms. 
We attempt to empirically test these assumptions here. Our main hypothesis is that 
the freehold farms enjoyed more secure property rights relative to the loan farms. If 
the freehold farms were more secure, we would expect them to be more valuable and 
therefore used more frequently as collateral for credit transactions.5 It is our new 
                                                        
4 See footnote 1 on controlling for distance from Cape Town. 
5 Refer to footnote 1 on problems with the measurement of land for economic value, like water rights and soil 
quality. Without precise geographic data on these farms, we cannot control for these variables. Some 
information exists on the area of some of these farms, but not to the extent found in the probate inventories and 
less on the loan farms than the freehold farms. Surveys and information on these farms were more accurately 
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combination of datasets which allows us to empirically test these hypotheses and 
historical descriptions to offer new insights into the role of property rights at the 
Cape. 
 
3 The freehold and loan farm data 
 
The data we use for our analysis comes from two sources: genealogical records and 
probate inventories. Both of these sources range over the entire eighteenth century, 
with the genealogical records continuing well after that. The genealogical records are 
familial lists from the first settlers with information on birth, marriage and death 
dates, as well as occupations.6 Our main variables of interest from the genealogies 
are whether someone was the eldest son, the number of children and the age of 
individuals. The second dataset, the probate inventories, list all the assets and debts 
of an individual at the time of death. The probate inventories are also known as the 
MOOC 8 series. Although not without bias, Schuurman (1980) concluded that they 
‘… enable the study of property according to occupation, age, and the number of 
children’. Cape Colony historians have also used them extensively. Newton-King 
(1999) used them to study the material life on the frontier. On wealth of the farmers 
of the Cape, Newton-King (1994) found poor farmers were in the minority and Fourie 
(2013) found the general wealth levels of settlers were ‘remarkable’. These 
inventories were captured from early settlement to 1834. 
 
The main concern for bias in probate inventories is the exclusion of poor individuals, 
females and the young. Because our analysis is focused on land ownership, the poor 
are likely excluded. The Orphan Chamber inventories also exclude the wealthiest 
individuals at the Cape, as they would have drawn up private testaments and wills 
which are not captured by the Orphan Chamber. Fourie (2013) compared the probate 
records used here to Stellenbosch probate inventories collected by Krzesinkski-De 
Widt (2002). The Stellenbosch inventories are significantly more affluent than the 
Orphan Chamber inventories since these were collected specifically for individuals 
without a will or where heirs were minors. Females are also excluded from the study 
because our instrument of choice is being the eldest son and the comparison is 
between eldest sons and sons born later. Age is not a concern either. Swanepoel 
(2017) has shown there is very little differences and no correlation between age and 
debt levels, while we later also show there are no significant differences in the 
distribution or level of ages between eldest sons and sons born later.  
 
                                                        
captured toward the start of the nineteenth century and the British colonial period at the Cape, but not for this 
early period studied in the paper. 
6 For detailed information on how the genealogies were compiled and can be used in economic and demographic 
studies, see Cilliers & Fourie (2014). 
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We match the probate inventories to the genealogies. This may introduce an 
additional type of selection bias. Swanepoel & Fourie (2018) offer an in-depth 
discussion of the differences and possible biases between the matched and 
unmatched sample. Their main conclusion is that the matched sample does not suffer 
from a strong bias in either direction of the wealth distribution, excluding both the 
poorest and richest in society. There is also no specific evidence that the younger 
siblings were systematically excluded from the probate inventories. Many examples 
exist of both eldest and younger siblings, like brothers Roelof (MOOC8/28.52) and 
Wynand Van Wijk (MOOC8/36.23). Roelof Van Wijk was the eldest child and first 
son of Wynand Willemsz Van Wijk and Magdalena Johanna Theunissen, while 
Wynand was their second son and sixth child. 
 
The inventories offer information on the real estate owned, the policy under which 
this real estate was owned and in some cases the value and size of these farms. More 
detailed descriptions on farms include the policy under which the farm was obtained 
from the Company. We focus on two policies observed most in the inventories: 
freehold farms (eigendom, erfgrondbrief or transport) and loan farms 
(leeningsplaats, in leening).7 Some inventories listed both types of farms, like Josua 
Joubert (MOOC8/21.32) who owned one farm Welbedagt, situated in Wagenmakers 
Vallei in the Stellenbosch District. The farm was owned in freehold when he died in 
1795. He also owned two loan farms, one Elands Jagt situated next to Molenaars 
Rivier in du Toits Kloof and another named Varkens Kop situated in the Sneeuberge. 
Table 1 provides a summary of the information available on land ownership from 
these inventories. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics on land/farms owned, with and without policies 
 
Property Category 
Number of 
farms 
% 
Farms 
with 
known 
policies 
% 
Farms 
with 
known 
policies 
Loan 
farms 
Freehold 
farms 
No land 1135 54.15 - - - - 
One Farm 621 29.63 362 64.64 272 90 
Two Farms 209 9.97 127 22.68 95 32 
Three Farms 58 2.77 33 5.89 19 14 
Four and more farms 73 3.48 38 6.79 15 23 
Total 2096 100 560 100 401 159 
 
Source: Probate inventories matched to genealogical records. Period: 1673 – 1834  
                                                        
7 Another form  quitrent (erfpagt) was observed, but only 60 are found in the inventories. These were mainly 
loan farms which were converted to freehold farms. Their tenure was closer to that of the freehold farms and 
we, therefore, include them as freehold farms. The results remain whether these are included or excluded. 
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Almost 54% of the inventories did not list any land. Looking at the other indicators 
of wealth, we find further evidence of left truncation. Table 2 also provides summary 
statistics on the outcome of interest, the value of debt at death by type of property 
right. It also records credit, whether an individual had both credit and debt, and the 
total number of bonds observed in the inventories and other household 
characteristics. The two groups excluded from the analysis below are the individuals 
with no land listed, and the individuals where farms are listed, but the type of property 
right regime is unknown. The individuals included are thus either those with loan 
farms or freehold farms listed. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of variables of interest by land ownership 
policies 
 
No Land 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max. 
Number of farms 755 - - - - 
Number of slaves 755 1.38 3.38 0 36 
Value of debt 755 367.94 1 275.19 0 20 167 
Value of credit 755 691.69 5 612.89 0 103 424 
Married 755 0.76 0.42 0 1 
Number of children 755 3.12 3.75 0 19 
Farms with unknown policies 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max. 
Number of farms 281 1.73 1.27 1 9 
Number of slaves 281 7.77 10.59 0 73 
Value of debt 281 3 732.94 12 594.28 0 135 755 
Value of credit 281 4 297.27 17 754.66 0 150 775 
Married 281 0.87 0.34 0 1 
Number of children 281 3.01 3.49 0 16 
Loan Farms 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max. 
Number of farms 259 1.47 0.90 1 8 
Number of slaves 259 5.68 7.75 0 45 
Value of debt 259 2 318.19 6 967.87 0 85 922 
Value of credit 259 1 076.98 5 945.41 0 92 246 
Married 259 0.80 0.40 0 1 
Number of children 259 4.34 4.27 0 23 
Freehold farms 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max. 
Number of farms 113 2.06 1.72 1 12 
Number of slaves 113 9.81 10.26 0 60 
Value of debt 113 2 875.35 5 414.77 0 35 197 
Value of credit 113 5 444.71 27 661.71 0 256 425 
Married 113 0.90 0.30 0 1 
Number of children 113 4.26 4.19 0 16 
Notes: Number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum statistics 
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The individuals with no land listed were by far the poorest, but by no means excluded 
from debt transactions. They owned on average 1 slave, while the individuals in the 
other categories owned more than 5 slaves on average. The mean value of debt for 
these individuals are 368 rds, while the credit value was even higher at 692 rds. More 
than three quarters were married (lower than the other groups) and they had an 
average of 3.12 children. Because we have no information on their real estate, either 
because they did not own any or because their land was not recorded in the 
inventories, we exclude these individuals from the analysis. Although this is a serious 
concern when we want to analyse the average level of wealth in the Colony, our 
purpose here is more focused: we only aim to compare those who own freehold 
versus loan farms. This exclusion, therefore, does not bias our results. 
 
The second group of individuals excluded from the analysis below are those with 
some farms, but where we do not observe the policy under which this land was 
owned. They look similar to those with freehold farms – if not slightly richer. They 
own more slaves than the loan farm individuals, but less than freehold farmers. They 
have the highest debt of all the groups, but less credit than the freehold individuals. 
Although the ideal would have been to include them in the analysis, because we 
cannot code their respective property regime, we exclude them from the analysis. 
 
In short, our summary statistics clearly show that the freehold farmers are wealthier 
than their loan farm counterparts.8 They have on average more land, slaves, debt, and 
extended more credit. Guelke & Shell (1989), Fourie & von Fintel (2010) and 
Dooling (2005) attribute the disparities in wealth to the landed gentry – owners of 
many freehold farms and slaves. These authors also suggest that it was the gentry 
that often supported the poorer farmers with loans. The differences between the 
groups of property owners are less pronounced when we consider the portion who 
were married and the average number of children. Because our analysis is focused 
on debt, Figure 1 shows the different natural logarithm distributions of debt for these 
two groups of property owners. These distributions support the historical narrative 
that claims the freehold farmers were wealthier than the loan farmers. The freehold 
farms’ mean and median are to the right of the loan farms’. The correlation between 
land ownership and debt is the focus of the next section. 
 
  
                                                        
8 If individuals owned both freehold and loan farms, we add them to individuals with freehold farms, because 
freehold farms were more scarce and valuable. Our results are robust whether we include these observations or 
not. 
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Notes: Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distributions: p-value=0.0000. We reject the hypothesis that 
the distributions are equal at the 5% significance level. 
 
Figure 1: Debt distributions of freehold and loan farms 
 
Source: Own calculations, probate inventories 
 
4 Correlations between land ownership and debt 
 
The descriptive statistics from the probate inventories suggest freehold farms were 
owned by the more affluent individuals of the Cape. Before we test the hypothesis 
that freehold farms (with more secure property rights) had more debt, we first focus 
on simple OLS regressions between land ownership and debt. We study the 
correlation between the number of farms and debt, and then compare the debt levels 
of individuals with at least one freehold farms and those with at least one loan farms. 
 
We include controls for other wealth variables – the number of slaves owned, 
whether the individual was married and their number of children. The number of 
slaves an individual owned had previously been by Guelke & Shell (1989) and Fourie 
(2014) as a proxy for wealth. Swanepoel & Fourie (2018) find a strong correlation 
between slave ownership and debt, and it remains an important alternative wealth 
indicator to the number of farms owned. We divide the number of slaves owned into 
groups as follows: 0 slaves, between 1 and 4 slaves, between 5 and 10 slaves and 
more than 10 slaves.9 If an individual was married it is likely they had access to more 
                                                        
9 The results presented here are not sensitive to this grouping.  
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credit due to network effects.10 Individuals with more children were more 
prosperous. This is expected; as new evidence by Cilliers (2015) shows, South 
Africa’s fertility decline only happened with the mineral revolution of the late 
nineteenth century. We also control for a trend in the debt of freehold and loan farms. 
We do this because of the relatively fixed supply of freehold farms after 1717, while 
the supply of loan farms remained elastic. Figure 2 shows the debt growth of loan 
farms and freehold farms over the period, as well as the fitted trend lines. It is clear 
that the loan farm debts increased more toward the end of the century, while the debts 
of freehold farms grew at a constant pace.11 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Debt growth over time by policy 
 
Source: Own calculations, probate inventories, and genealogical records 
 
Table 3 shows the differences in debt for individuals with freehold farms to loan 
farms. This is the first evidence that supports the hypothesis that the individuals with 
freehold farms were wealthier, had better-protected property rights and more debt. If 
an individual owned a freehold farm, their debt level was 36.58% higher than 
individuals who did not own freehold farms according to this correlation. Slave 
ownership continues to matter for the debt of freehold farmers and loan farms. 
Neither the marriage nor the number of children has a significant correlation with 
debt. 
                                                        
10 Because debt in the probate inventories does not distinguish between the debt of the wife or husband, it is 
safe to assume that both have the responsibility to repay these debts. 
11 Ideally, we would like to do robustness checks for smaller periods as well, but the current sample size does 
not allow for this. 
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Table 3: OLS regression between debt of freehold and loan farms 
 
Dependent variable: Natural logarithm of individual debt, 1673 – 1834 
 Freehold farms 
 Coefficient Std. error 
Farms owned under freehold policy 0,3658** 0,1505 
Zero slaves (ref.)    
Between 1 and 4 slaves 0,5241*** 0,1738 
Between 5 and 10 slaves 1,0333*** 0,1867 
More than 10 slaves 1,7380*** 0,2202 
Married 0,0108 0,1870 
Number of children in the household -0,0176 0,0156 
Control for trend YES  
Constant 5,5862*** 0,2096 
N 463 
R-squared 0,2394 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of an individuals debt level. The farms owned under freehold 
is a dummy variable: 1 if any farm was owned under freehold, 0 if loan farms were listed on the inventory. 
The slave groups are the reference to those with no slaves. Married is 1 if the individual was married at the 
time of death, and the number of children is recorded from the genealogical records. Significance levels: * 
10%, ** 5% and *** 1 %. 
 
These estimated impacts point to different outcomes for freehold and loan farms, 
suggesting there was at least some role for property rights to play in determining the 
value of debt transactions. On first glance, the individuals with freehold farms were 
more prosperous and had more debt – supporting the hypothesis that they had better-
protected property rights. One concern with these correlations is reverse causality. 
Individuals with freehold farms have more debt because they had more collateral due 
to better property rights relative to individuals with loan farms. But the reverse is 
also true: Individuals with freehold farms may have had more debt because they used 
debt to purchase these farms in the first place. Therefore, the OLS regression results 
will be upwardly biased. 
 
Another possible channel for freehold farms to have more debt is an income and 
revenue channel. The freehold farms may have been more profitable (and therefore 
have more access to credit) simply because they did not pay the rent the loan farmers 
were obliged to pay. We do not think this was the case for two reasons. First, the 
rents on the loan farms were often not collected. Second, the ratio between debt and 
the annual rent is too high to believe the rents were an obstacle to the credit market. 
The annual rent of 24 rds dwarfs in comparison with average debts of 2 318 rds 
(Table 1). Next, we turn to address the reverse causality between debt and land 
ownership with the use of an instrumental variable. 
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5 An instrumental variable approach: Eldest son, debt and 
 freehold farms 
 
Due to the possibility of reverse causality and endogeneity in estimating the effect of 
property right regimes on debt levels, we use an instrumental variable approach here 
to estimate the effect of owning a freehold farm on an individual’s debt level. Our 
instrument of choice is being the firstborn son in a household relative to second, third 
or sons born later. Many studies have used the random variation of birth order to 
study different economic outcomes. These economic outcomes include schooling or 
returns to education (Black et al., 2005b), income (Kantarevic & Mechoulan, 2006), 
labour market outcomes like employment (Black et al., 2005a) and the decision to 
migrate (Abramitzky et al., 2012). As far as we are aware, there have not been studies 
done using first-born sons and property rights. 
 
To use an instrumental variable, we estimate a two-stage least squares regression 
where the first regression is related to the probability of a first-born son owning a 
freehold farm, and the second regression relating to the relationship between owning 
a freehold farm and the natural logarithm of individual debt. We also control for a 
vector of individual characteristics, which include our wealth measurements: slave 
ownership, whether an individual was married, the number of children and a trend in 
the growth of debt for the property types.  
 
For our instrument to estimate the local average treatment effects (LATE), it should 
comply with the following four assumptions: independence (exogeneity), exclusion 
restriction, the first stage (relevance) and monotonicity assumptions (Angrist & 
Pischke 2009: 153). The independence assumption requires that the instrument is 
randomly assigned. This means firstborn sons should not have an innate higher 
ability or another unobservable characteristic which makes them more likely to own 
a freehold farm. Although not directly testable, we do not think there is any reason 
to believe the eldest sons would be systematically better and more able to own 
freehold farms. The randomness of birth order, we believe, is sufficient to pass the 
independence assumption. 
 
The exclusion restriction requires that birth order does not have a direct causal effect 
on the level of debt. In previous research (Swanepoel & Fourie, 2018), it has been 
found that debt was a general occurrence at the Cape. The best way to support the 
exclusion restriction is to look at the debt distribution of the eldest sons versus sons 
born after. Figure 3 shows these distributions. Table 4 provide the t-test for the size 
of debts: there is no significant difference between the size of debt for eldest sons 
and sons born later. Since there is no significant difference in either distribution or 
size of debt for eldest sons to other sons, we assume there is no direct relationship 
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between being the eldest son and his debt level. We would argue that being the eldest 
son satisfies the exclusion restriction. 
 
Table 4: T-test of eldest son vs non-eldest sons, debt size, owning a freehold 
farm and age 
 
 Debt size Owned freehold farm Age 
 N Mean N Mean N Mean 
Not eldest son 638 1535,01 169 0.1834 1152 48.6946 
Eldest son 681 1692,86 179 0.4302 1238 49.8334 
Combined 1319 1616,02 348 0.3103 2390 49.579 
Difference   -156,79   -0.2467   -2.4818 
t-stat -0,411 -5,1443 -1,4662 
p-value 0,6811 0,0000 0,1427 
 
Source: Debt size and owned a freehold farm from probate inventories; age from 
genealogical records matched to probate inventories. 
 
 
Notes: Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distributions: p-value=0.134. We cannot reject the 
hypothesis that the distributions are equal at the 5% significance level. 
 
Figure 3: Debt distributions for eldest and non-eldest sons 
 
Source: Own calculations, probate inventories 
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Two other channels through which the instrument may have an effect on individual 
debt are longevity and occupation. We observe both these variables from the 
genealogical records12 and match it to individuals in the probate inventories. For 
occupation, higher skilled occupations may present less risky borrowing and 
therefore the ability to obtain more debt. Firstborn sons may also have more 
opportunities to join these higher skilled occupations. The occupations we observe 
are divided into different skill levels: unskilled or low skills, farmers, medium 
skilled, highly skilled and professional. We run an ordered logit to test if there is a 
preference for eldest sons in higher skills categories (Table 5). The elder sons do not 
have a significantly larger share in more professional skills relative to sons born later. 
 
Table 5: Ordered logistic regression for eldest and other sons 
 
 Skill level 
 Coefficient Std. error Odds ration Std. error 
First son 0,1165 0,2182 1.1235 0.2451 
N 313 313 
 
Source: Matched sample between genealogical records and probate inventories. 
 
The second concern for the channel of our instrument may be longevity – individuals 
who were older when they died had longer to accumulate debt and real estate. First-
born sons may also have longer longevity because of resources reverted to the eldest 
son rather than sons born later. However, we find no significant difference in the ages 
of eldest sons relative to sons born later. Eldest sons’ expected age for the period 
(conditional on reaching 16 years) was 49.83 years, while sons born later lived an 
average of 48.69 years. Figure 4 shows the age distribution of eldest and non-eldest 
sons, while table 4 also shows the t-test for average ages between these two groups. 
Both these measures show no significant difference for the eldest sons and sons born 
later, the strongest evidence that being the firstborn son is an appropriate instrument.  
 
For the first stage assumption, the eldest sons need to have a higher probability of 
owning a freehold farm. The system of inheritance at the Cape was one of partible 
inheritance derived from Roman-Dutch law. This meant the individual’s estate was 
divided half to the spouse and the equally among the children. Most often the estate 
was sold in its entirety at auction and the proceeds distributed between the heirs. 
Despite this, anecdotal evidence has been provided by Newton-King (1994) and 
Dooling (2005; 2007) that the eldest sons were favoured when it came to the 
inheritance of property and freehold farms. Newton-King (1994) suggested that older 
                                                        
12 For more information on these records, see Cilliers (2015). She further provides information on which 
occupations are divided into which skill category. 
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sons inherited the freehold farms, while sons born later inherited loan farms. Dooling 
(2005) and Dooling (2007) referred to how in this patriarchal society sons were 
inevitably favoured before daughters when it came to inheritance.13 With this 
anecdotal evidence at hand, we tested the likelihood of older sons owning more 
freehold farms and indeed found a higher probability among eldest sons of owning 
freehold farms, at 48%, while of sons born later, only 18% owned freehold farms 
(also in Table 5).  
 
 
Notes: Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distributions: p-value=0.06. We cannot reject the hypothesis 
that the distributions are equal at the 5% significance level. 
 
Figure 4: Age at death distributions for eldest and non-eldest sons 
 
Source: Own calculations, genealogical records 
 
Finally, monotonicity requires that the instrument affects all the treated in the same 
direction, that is, being the eldest son will always make you more likely to own a 
freehold farm rather than less likely. The historical evidence presented above not 
only supports the first stage assumption, but also the monotonicity assumption. 
Eldest sons were always more likely to own farms relative to their brothers born later 
and not the reverse, across time and districts.14   
                                                        
13 How the settlers bypassed the system and how firstborn sons managed to obtain the freehold farms remain 
unknown. 
14 We can investigate the location of the death of the eldest brother versus brothers born later in either data 
sources. However, the death locations are not also recorded. 
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Being the firstborn son appears to be a valid instrument for the probability of having 
a freehold farm relative to sons who were born later. Table 6 presents the regression 
results for the instrumental variable estimation. The result supports the hypothesis 
that the eldest son had a 17% higher probability to have a freehold farm relative to 
sons born later, significant at the 1% level. Individuals with more slaves were also 
more likely to own freehold farms. Having a spouse listed on the inventory is also 
associated with higher probability of owning a freehold farm, but none of the other 
characteristics are associated with a higher probability of owning a freehold farm.  
 
Table 6: Regression results from instrumental variable analysis 
 
PANEL A 
First-stage regression Second Stage Regression 
Owned a freehold Ln(Debt Value) 
First son 0,1735*** Owned a freehold farm 0,1907 
  0,0516   0,9984 
0 Slaves  (ref,) 0 Slaves (ref,) 
Between 1 and 4 slaves 0,1411** Between 1 and 4 slaves 0,1674 
  0,0710   0,2658 
Between 5 and 10 slaves 0,2221*** Between 5 and 10 slaves 0,8850** 
  0,0708   0,3316 
More than 10 slaves 0,3738*** More than 10 slaves 1,6309*** 
  0,0750   0,4571 
Married 0,1913* Spouse listed on inventory -0,09908 
  0,0805   0,3855 
Children -0,0087 Children -0,0078 
  0,0066   0,0256 
Trend control YES  YES 
    
Constant -0,0979 Constant 6,2289*** 
  0,0845   0,2747 
N 278   
F(7, 287) 11,30   
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of an individuals debt level. The farms owned under freehold 
is a dummy variable: 1 if any farm was owned under freehold, 0 if loan farms were listed in the inventory. First 
son is a dummy variable for being the firstborn son (eldest son) in the family and is zero if it is sons born later. 
The slave groups are the reference to those with no slaves. Married is 1 if the individual was married at some 
point, and the number of children is recorded from the genealogical records. The decrease in observations is 
due to not all the individuals who owned land was identified in the genealogical records from which the eldest 
sons were identified. The F-statistic is larger than 10, consistent with a strong instrument for the Staiger-Stock 
(1997) rule of thumb (10) for exactly identified two-stage least squares. See text for more details.  
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1 %, standard errors below coefficient. 
 
Source: Probate inventories, own calculations. Dependent on son reaching 16 years 
of age.  
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The second stage regression, however, reveals that, given the instrumental variable 
of a being the eldest son, owning a freehold farm does not matter for the individual’s 
debt level.15 Although the coefficient on freehold farms are positive, the effect is less 
than half of the estimates in the OLS regression and turns insignificant. This suggests 
that owning a freehold farm with more secure de jure property rights did not matter 
for debt transactions. In the property right framework sketched in section 2, the debt 
market at the Cape considered the de facto property rights of land more important for 
transactions. This supports the historiography of the Cape in which authors like 
Guelke (1989) and Newton-King (1999) who have provided evidence that the 
property rights of freehold farms were similar to the loan farms. It also advances the 
international literature, by focussing on microeconomic information and the recent 
literature which suggest social norms and de facto rights are important when de jure 
rights are established. 
 
For our other variables of interest, the higher groups of slave ownership have a 
significant effect on debt, suggesting the slaves was an important aspect of access to 
debt at the Cape.16 The spouse and number of children in the household remain 
insignificant for debt levels. Given that property rights seemed not to matter and the 
only significant impact comes from slaves, it provides support for the recent literature 
on early credit markets. This literature postulates that credit and debt were not more 
frequently used by poor, as suggested before, but by those with the greatest assets 
(e.g., Muldrew, 2012; Ogilvie et al., 2012). 
 
The Cragg-Donald Wald statistic (12.50) is larger than the rule of thumb test of 10 
(Staiger & Stock, 1997). This suggests that the instrument passes the weak instrument 
test, even with a just-identified regression.17 
 
Before we discussed that individuals, who owned land, but of which the policy is 
uncertain would be excluded (p.45). As a robustness check, we include these 
individuals as freehold farms. These individuals according to the descriptive statistics 
are closer in debt and wealth to the individuals with freehold farms. The results 
remain the same. Firstborn sons are still 17% more likely to own a freehold farm, 
while the second stage regression show an increase to the coefficient of owning a 
freehold farm, it does not reach the levels of the OLS regression. In fact, it is still 
40% lower than the OLS regression. When these individuals are included, the two 
                                                        
15 The debt on a farm was not inherited with the fixed property, but all debts of the estate was repaid before any 
inheritance by children were received. 
16 For more information on the significance of slaves and the credit market at the Cape, see Swanepoel & Fourie, 
(2018).  
17 Because we only have one endogenous regressor and one instrument, the specification is just identified. Other 
tests like AR and Kleinbergen Paap do not allow for just identified regressions and cannot be performed here. 
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stage-least squares regression becomes more precisely estimated. These results are 
presented in Table 7. 
 
Table 7: Regression results from instrumental variable analysis including 
unknown property 
 
PANEL A 
First-stage regression Second Stage Regression 
Owned a freehold Ln(Debt Value) 
First son 0,1658*** Owned a freehold farm 0,2499 
  0,0431   0,8174 
0 Slaves  (ref,) 0 Slaves (ref,) 
Between 1 and 4 slaves 0,0903 Between 1 and 4 slaves 0,0360 
  0,0592   0,1962 
Between 5 and 10 slaves 0,1207** Between 5 and 10 slaves 0,7594*** 
  0,0609   0,2162 
More than 10 slaves 0,2354*** More than 10 slaves 1,5500*** 
  0,0685   0,2738 
Married 0,2440*** Spouse listed on inventory -0,1484 
  0,0684   0,3145 
Children -0,0263*** Children -0,0128 
  0,0058   0,0313 
Trend control YES  YES 
    
Constant 0,2725 Constant 6,3743*** 
  0,0733   0,3634 
N 508   
F(7, 287) 14,76   
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of an individuals debt level. The farms owned under freehold 
is a dummy variable: 1 if any farm was owned under freehold or if the policy of the property is unknown, 0 if 
loan farms were listed in the inventory. First son is a dummy variable for being the firstborn son (eldest son) in 
the family and is zero if it is sons born later. The slave groups are the reference to those with no slaves. Married 
is 1 if the individual was married at some point, and the number of children is recorded from the genealogical 
records. The decrease in observations is due to not all the individuals who owned land was identified in the 
genealogical records from which the eldest sons were identified. The F-statistic is larger than 10, consistent 
with a strong instrument for the Staiger-Stock (1997) rule of thumb (10) for exactly identified two-stage least 
squares. See text for more details. 
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1 %, standard errors below coefficient. 
 
Source: Probate inventories, own calculations. Dependent on son reaching 16 years 
of age.  
 
The freehold and loan farms had distinct formal processes for claims and legal 
specifications differed. Despite the differences in de jure property rights, the 
economic outcomes, measured here by the value of debt transactions, for the two 
systems do not show any differences. The fact that our instrumental variable 
regressions show much lower estimates on the effect of having a freehold farm rather 
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than owing a loan farm suggests that de facto property rights, not de jure property 
rights, were more important for for economic decision-making.18 Like De Soto and 
Lamoreaux suggested, the local conditions under which the property right regime is 
observed seems to trump the formal property right system that is promulgated. In the 
case of the Dutch Cape Colony, the settlers’ view was that the loan farms were as 
secure in their property rights as the freehold farms. 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
For any economic transaction to take place, well-defined and well-enforced property 
rights are required. Economists suspect that property right regimes are rooted in the 
history of the region, but it has been difficult to prove the outcome of this on 
economic development empirically. We do this by investigating property rights’ role 
in the debt market of the Cape Colony. The Cape offers an alternative to the 
development of de jure and de facto property rights. At the Cape, property rights of 
loan farms were developed from de facto property rights to de jure property rights, 
while other case studies like the United States, Australia and Brazil developed from 
de jure property rights to de facto property rights. The two land tenure systems, 
freehold and loan farms enabled us to study individuals with the different types of 
property and to compare them one another. The contribution of this research has been 
to focus on a microeconomic outcome, individual debt levels, rather than 
macroeconomic outcomes.  
 
Economic theory would suggest land is only valuable for debt transactions if there is 
no asymmetry and uncertainty regarding land rights. Historians of the Cape have 
suggested the de facto property rights of the loan farms were the same and as secure 
as the freehold farms, even though the de jure rights between the systems differed. 
Our hypothesis is that individuals with freehold farms had more secure de jure 
property rights and freehold farms should, therefore, be more valuable for debt 
transactions. On this basis, individuals with freehold farms should have more debt. 
The descriptive statistics certainly supported this hypothesis; individuals with 
freehold farms had higher correlations with debt relative to individuals with loan 
farms or individuals with no farms. However, after accounting for endogeneity 
concerns regarding the relationship between debt and land rights, the significance of 
owning a freehold for debt transactions disappears. We tested the assumption by 
using an instrument of the eldest son, who had a higher probability of owning a 
freehold farm. Our results provide empirical evidence for what historians have 
suspected: that the institution of property right depends on the society in which it is 
                                                        
18 To further investigate the positive coefficient, would require further information unavailable at the time of 
writing. This could include the type of farming activities between loan farms and freehold farms, or the 
profitability of these farms. 
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embedded. Instead of formal de jure rights, how rights are perceived and used by 
individuals (de facto) is likely to have a bigger influence on economic transactions. 
 
Property rights remain important for economic growth and development, but more 
recent research has started to show that it is more complex – the local conditions also 
matter. We gave another example, here, of how local conditions and how these rights 
are perceived matters as well. Besley (1995) said, ‘…formal (de jure) rights might 
have very little to do with the ability to exercise these rights (de facto).‘ If the answer 
of institutional economics is to give de jure property rights in land to individuals, 
without taking into account the local de facto conditions, property rights might not 
lead to the expected gains in economic growth. Schlager & Ostrom (1992) already 
called for an investigation into ‘how various types of institutional arrangements 
perform comparatively when confronted with similarly difficult environments‘. In 
line with the literature, we attempt to show the perception of property rights at the 
Cape, or the de facto mattered more than de jure property rights delineated by laws.  
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